### A Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life

Committee on Standards in Public Life



December 2017 Cm 9543



# Intimidation in Public Life: A Review by the Committee on Standards in Public Life

Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty December 2017



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#### The Seven Principles of Public Life

The Principles of public life apply to anyone who works as a public office-holder. This includes all those who are elected or appointed to public office, nationally and locally, and all people appointed to work in the Civil Service, local government, the police, courts and probation services, non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), and in the health, education, social and care services. All public office-holders are both servants of the public and stewards of public resources. The principles also have application to all those in other sectors delivering public services.

#### Selflessness

Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest.

#### Integrity

Holders of public office must avoid placing themselves under any obligation to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to influence them in their work. They should not act or take decisions in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends. They must declare and resolve any interests and relationships.

#### **Objectivity**

Holders of public office must act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on merit, using the best evidence and without discrimination or bias.

#### Accountability

Holders of public office are accountable to the public for their decisions and actions and must submit themselves to the scrutiny necessary to ensure this.

#### **Openness**

Holders of public office should act and take decisions in an open and transparent manner. Information should not be withheld from the public unless there are clear and lawful reasons for so doing.

#### Honesty

Holders of public office should be truthful.

#### Leadership

Holders of public office should exhibit these principles in their own behaviour. They should actively promote and robustly support the principles and be willing to challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs.





#### **Dear Prime Minister,**

I am pleased to present the 17th report of the Committee of Standards in Public Life, on intimidation in public life. You invited the Committee to undertake a review on the intimidation of Parliamentary candidates in July 2017, considering the wider implications for public office-holders, and producing recommendations for action which could be taken in the short- and the long-term. The Committee wishes to thank all those who gave evidence to the review, particularly those who were willing to relate often highly personal and distressing experiences of intimidation.

The vitality of our political culture depends upon free and vigorous expression of opinion, and it is crucial that this freedom is preserved.

The increasing prevalence of intimidation of Parliamentary candidates, and others in public life, should concern everyone who cares about our democracy. This is not about defending elites from justified criticism or preventing the public from scrutinising those who represent them: it is about defending the fundamental structures of political freedom.

A significant proportion of candidates at the 2017 general election experienced harassment, abuse and intimidation. There has been persistent, vile and shocking abuse, threatened violence including sexual violence, and damage to property. It is clear that much of this behaviour is targeted at certain groups. The widespread use of social media platforms is the most significant factor driving the behaviour we are seeing.

Intimidatory behaviour is already affecting the way in which MPs are relating to their constituents, has put off candidates who want to serve their communities from standing for public offices, and threatens to damage the vibrancy and diversity of our public life. However, the Committee believes that our political culture can be protected from further damage if action is taken now.

Having taken evidence from a number of Parliamentary candidates, and a range of expert organisations and members of the public, it is clear that there is no single, easy solution. But, at a watershed moment in our political history, it is time for a new and concerted response.

Our report makes recommendations which address the full breadth of the problem we face. Those across public life must work together to address this problem: we must see greater energy and action from social media companies, political parties, Parliament, the police, broadcast and print media, and from MPs and Parliamentary candidates themselves. Above all, this is a question of leadership by our largest political parties. This is all the more important in the light of recent allegations of sexual harassment and bullying in Parliament which will have shaken public confidence in politicians. Political parties will need to work together to address intimidation in public life; they should not use this report and its recommendations for partisan purposes or political gain.

We propose legislative changes that the government should bring forward on social media companies' liability for illegal content online, and an electoral offence of intimidating Parliamentary candidates and party campaigners. Political parties must also put in place measures for more effective joint working to combat intimidation in advance of the next general election. In the long term, prevention will be more effective and important than any individual sanction. Those in public life must adopt a more healthy public discourse and must stand together to oppose behaviour which threatens the integrity of public life.

I commend the report to you.

#### Lord Bew

#### Chair, Committee on Standards in Public Life





"While we celebrate our diversity, what surprises me time and time again as I travel around the constituency is that we are far more united and have far more in common than that which divides us."

Jo Cox MP





## Contents

Executive summary	13
Introduction	24
Chapter 1 – Intimidation in public life	26
Chapter 2 – Social media	31
Chapter 3 – Political parties	46
Chapter 4 – Law, policing and prosecution	57
Chapter 5 – Taking responsibility	70
Chapter 6 – The impact of intimidation	77
Appendix 1 – About the Committee on Standards in Public Life	81
Appendix 2 – Methodology	82



## **Executive summary**

Intimidation in public life presents a threat to the very nature of representative democracy in the UK. Addressing this intimidatory, bullying and abusive culture matters. It matters for the diversity of our public life, it matters for the way in which the public can engage with representative democracy, and it matters for the freedom to discuss and debate issues and interests.

While intimidation in public life is nothing new, the scale and intensity of intimidation is now shaping public life in ways which are a serious issue. Social media companies have been too slow in taking action on online intimidation to protect their users. The political parties have failed to show leadership in calling out intimidatory behaviour and changing the tone of political debate. Police authorities have shown inconsistency in supporting those facing illegal intimidatory activities, and electoral law is out of date on this issue. So, we make recommendations for action to social media companies, political parties, government, police and prosecutors.

Intimidation also reflects broader issues with our public political culture. Those in public life must take responsibility for shaping that culture. They must take steps to ensure that their behaviour does not open the door for intimidation and work to build public trust in public life. They should uphold high ethical standards, and should never themselves engage in, incite or encourage derogatory or dehumanising political debate.

To understand this issue we have heard from a range of individuals and organisations, including candidates, MPs, social media companies, local councillors, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and journalists, police and security authorities, and other relevant stakeholders. We held 34 individual meetings, a roundtable, and a public and private hearing. We also received 88 written submissions to our call for evidence. Our recommendations stand as a package. They should be implemented together, as a comprehensive response to an issue of central importance to our representative democracy. It is clear that determined action on the part of all those involved is required. The cost of not doing so is too high.

#### Our recommendations

The widespread use of **social media** has been the most significant factor accelerating and enabling intimidatory behaviour in recent years. Although social media helps to promote widespread access to ideas and engagement in debate, it also creates an intensely hostile online environment. Some have felt the need to disengage entirely from social media because of the abuse they face, and it has put off others who may wish to stand for public office.

In the fast-paced and rapidly developing world of social media, the companies themselves and government must both proactively address the issue of intimidation online. Not enough has been done. The Committee is deeply concerned about the limited engagement of the social media companies in tackling these issues.

Currently, social media companies do not have liability for the content on their sites, even where that content is illegal. This is largely due to the EU E-Commerce Directive (2000), which treats the social media companies as 'hosts' of online content. It is clear, however, that this legislation is out of date. Facebook, Twitter and Google are not simply platforms for the content that others post; they play a role in shaping what users see. We understand that they do not consider themselves as publishers, responsible for reviewing and editing everything that others post on their sites. But with developments in technology, the time has come for the companies to take more responsibility for illegal material that appears on their platforms.



The government should seek to legislate to shift the balance of liability for illegal content to the social media companies away from them being passive 'platforms' for illegal content. Given the government's stated intention to leave the EU Single Market, legislation can be introduced to this effect without being in breach of EU law. We believe government should legislate to rebalance this liability for illegal content, and thereby drive change in the way social media companies operate in combatting illegal behaviour online in the UK.

Government should bring forward legislation to shift the liability of illegal content online towards social media companies.

The social media companies are not providing a safe experience for their users. This is having a severely negative impact on a wide range of people in public life, who can be subject to persistent, vitriolic and threatening abuse online.

In advance of legislative change, social media companies must take responsibility for developing technology and the necessary options for users to tackle the issue of intimidation and abuse on their platforms.

Social media companies must develop and implement automated techniques to identify intimidatory content posted on their platforms. They should use this technology to ensure intimidatory content is taken down as soon as possible.

Social media companies must do more to prevent users being inundated with hostile messages on their platforms, and to support users who become victims of this behaviour. Social media companies must implement tools to enhance the ability of users to tackle online intimidation through user options.

The Committee is deeply concerned about the failure of Google, Facebook and Twitter to collect performance data on the functioning of their report and takedown processes. Their lack of transparency is part of the problem. None of these companies would tell us if they collect this data, and do not set targets for the time taken for reported content to be taken off the platform. This seems extraordinary when their business is data driven in all other aspects. This data must be collected, and made available to users to judge the companies' performance on takedown.

All social media companies must ensure they are able to make decisions quickly and consistently on the takedown of intimidatory content online.

Twitter, Facebook and Google must publish UK-level performance data on the number of reports they receive, the percentage of reported content that is taken down, and the time it takes to take down that content, on at least a quarterly basis.

Social media companies must urgently revise their tools for users to escalate any reports of potential illegal online activity to the police.

Political tensions run high during election campaigns, and this also plays out online. During election campaigns, political debate and discussion online can become particularly heated. This can be amplified when intimidatory content online is not taken down quickly enough, as it shapes the tone of political debate.



Therefore, government should work with the social media companies to develop an independent body which can be set up during election campaigns as a 'trusted flagger' social media reporting team for illegal, hateful and intimidatory content. This would lead to any intimidatory content online being dealt with more quickly during the fast-paced context of an election.

The social media companies should work with the government to establish a 'pop-up' social media reporting team for election campaigns.

Social media companies should actively provide advice, guidance and support to Parliamentary candidates on steps they can take to remain safe and secure while using their sites.

**Political parties** have an important duty of care to their candidates, members and supporters to take action to address intimidation in public life. Intimidation takes place across the political spectrum, both in terms of those engaging in and those receiving intimidation.

The leadership of political parties must recognise this duty of care, and call out and condemn intimidatory behaviour wherever it occurs. Political parties must also be prepared to work together and engage constructively on these issues. Although political parties rely heavily on volunteers, particularly at election time, given the seriousness of the intimidation experienced by candidates and others, the parties have a responsibility to show leadership in addressing intimidation.

Those in positions of leadership within political parties must set an appropriate tone during election campaigns, and make clear that any intimidatory behaviour is unacceptable. They should challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs. Political parties must proactively work together to tackle the issue of intimidation in public life.

Some of those engaging in intimidatory behaviour towards Parliamentary candidates and others are members of political parties and/or the fringe groups of political parties. Leaders across the political spectrum must be clear that they have no tolerance for this sort of behaviour in their party, wherever it occurs. They should not remain silent whenever and wherever intimidation takes place.

One important part of setting expectations for the appropriate behaviour is through a code of conduct for members. Codes of conduct should also be supported by training on the code, and backed-up with appropriate disciplinary processes and sanctions for inappropriate behaviour.

Political parties should set clear expectations about the behaviour expected of their members, both offline and online through a code of conduct for members which specifically prohibits any intimidatory behaviour. Parties should ensure that members are familiar with the code. The consequences of any breach of the code should be clear and unambiguous.

Political parties must ensure that party members who breach the party's code of conduct by engaging in intimidation are consistently and appropriately disciplined in a timely manner.

Political parties must collect data on the number of complaints against members for engaging in intimidatory behaviour, and the outcome of any disciplinary processes which result from these complaints.



Leaders of political parties should always call out intimidatory behaviour, even when it is perpetrated by those in the party's fringes. Fringe group leaders and spokespeople should immediately denounce any intimidatory behaviour on the part of their members or supporters.

To tackle this issue, more cross-party collaboration is needed. The parties should come together to develop a joint code of conduct on intimidatory behaviour during election campaigns. This would encourage cross-party consensus on recognising and addressing the issue, and reduce the party political element of enforcing breaches of the code.

This code should be jointly enforced by the political parties through regular meetings during election campaigns. By working together, parties can take steps to set aside partisan differences to combat the important issue of intimidation in our public life.

The political parties must work together to develop a joint code of conduct on intimidatory behaviour during election campaigns by December 2018. The code should be jointly enforced by the political parties.

Political parties have a responsibility to support and try to protect those who give their time, often on a voluntary basis, towards the democratic process and public life. This includes support and training on online campaigning.

In particular, the parties must provide support for those who are most likely to be subject to the most intensely hostile abuse online. We are deeply concerned about the impact of intimidation on the diversity of our representative democracy, therefore, the parties have an important responsibility to support female, BAME, and LGBT candidates and prospective candidates in particular. Political parties must take steps to provide support for all candidates, including through networks, training, support and resources. In particular, the parties should develop these support mechanisms for female, BAME, and LGBT candidates who are more likely to be targeted as subjects of intimidation.

Political parties must offer more support and training to candidates on their use of social media. This training should include: managing social media profiles, block and mute features, reporting content, and recognising when behaviour should be reported directly to the police.

For the **law** to be effective and enforceable, existing legislation must have a sufficient scope, the **police** must be able to curtail and contain intimidatory behaviour, as well as be able to gather the required evidence where a prosecution is appropriate, and **prosecutors** must have appropriate guidance in place.

We have seen no evidence that the current criminal law is insufficient. New offences specific to social media are unnecessary and could be rendered outdated quickly.

Intimidation of Parliamentary candidates is of particular significance because of the threat it poses to the integrity of the democratic process and of public service more widely. Specific electoral sanctions would reflect the seriousness of this threat. A new electoral offence of intimidating Parliamentary candidates and party campaigners during an election should be considered. This would serve to highlight the seriousness of the issue, result in more appropriate sanctions, and serve as a deterrent to those specifically targeting Parliamentary candidates and their supporters.



The government should consult on the introduction of a new offence in electoral law of intimidating Parliamentary candidates and party campaigners.

The requirement that candidates standing for election as local councillors must publish their home address on the ballot paper has enabled intimidatory behaviour. There is crossparty consensus for legislation to remove this requirement, which the government should bring forward. Provisions already exist to prevent local authority members' particular financial and other interests being publicly declared where there is a risk of intimidation to them or their family, and these provisions should be drawn to members' attention by Monitoring Officers.

The government should bring forward legislation to remove the requirement for candidates standing as local councillors to have their home addresses published on the ballot paper. Returning Officers should not disclose the home addresses of those attending an election count.

Local Authority Monitoring Officers should ensure that members required to declare pecuniary interests are aware of the sensitive interests provisions in the Localism Act 2011.

There have been a significant number of prosecutions and convictions, with a relatively high rate of successful prosecutions, for offences covering intimidatory behaviour. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) guidelines on cases involving social media communications rightly set a high evidential threshold and demanding public interest test, in order to ensure compatibility with the Article 10 right to freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights. We are persuaded that the CPS guidelines are reasonable and proportionate.

We commend the work of the Parliamentary Liaison and Investigation Team (PLaIT), a specialist police team based in Parliament which is building a national picture of the security threat to MPs and acts as a central point of contact and advice for individual MPs, and makes recommendations for additional security measures. However, its effectiveness requires MPs to make full use of the advice and services offered to them and to report any threats.

MPs should actively co-operate with the police and other security services working to address the security threats facing Parliamentarians and Parliamentary candidates.

There is currently inconsistency in the approach taken locally by police forces in policing intimidatory behaviour towards Parliamentary candidates. This may be due to police forces not fully understanding the context in which MPs and candidates operate, as well as a lack of understanding of social media technologies. Whilst we are mindful of pressures on police resources, better guidance and training is needed in this area.

The National Police Chiefs Council should ensure that local police forces have sufficient training to enable them to effectively investigate offences committed through social media. Local police forces should be able to access advice and guidance on the context in which MPs and Parliamentary candidates work.

There is a lack of policing guidance on offences which constitute intimidation during election periods, and local police sometimes conflate personal threats and public order offences. General election periods are a heightened environment in which candidates, in particular MPs standing for re-election, are more likely to experience intimidation.



The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice for elections should be updated to include offences relating to intimidation, including offences committed through social media.

The rise of social media, in particular its transnational reach, has created significant challenges for policing. A most significant challenge is establishing who is responsible for sending a particular communication.

The Home Office and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport should develop a strategy for engaging with international partners to promote international consensus on what constitutes hate crime and intimidation online.

Parliamentary candidates have a broad range of expectations about what the police would be able to do in response to intimidatory behaviour they experience. Greater clarity as to what behaviour is and is not illegal, and what Parliamentary candidates can expect from their local police force, would assist Parliamentary candidates during a campaign and would result in more effective policing.

The National Police Chiefs Council, working with the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing, should produce accessible guidance for Parliamentary candidates giving clear advice on behaviour they may experience during a campaign which is likely to constitute a criminal offence and what they should do in the face of such intimidation.

It is important that those who perpetrate intimidatory behaviour face proportionate legal sanctions. However, the law is a blunt instrument for dealing with much intimidatory behaviour. Policing and the law should not be seen as the primary means of addressing this issue. The primary focus must be on prevention. Everyone in public life must play their part in **taking responsibility** for combatting intimidatory behaviour; this includes in particular MPs, leaders of political parties, and the media. They all play a role in shaping a healthy public political culture which does not open the door to intimidation.

The public's lack of trust in politics and the political system creates an environment where intimidation in public life is more likely. Everyone in public life must take responsibility for turning this around. They need to uphold high ethical standards, so that they do not undermine or bring into disrepute the institutions they are part of. This point was emphasised in the submissions to our review from members of the public.

Nobody in public life should engage in intimidatory behaviour, nor condone or tolerate it. All those in public life have a responsibility to challenge and report it wherever it occurs.

Those in public life should seek to uphold high standards of conduct, adhering to the Seven Principles of Public Life, and help prevent a decline in public trust in political institutions through their own conduct.

Those in positions of power and leadership in public life have a particular responsibility to consider how their tone is likely to shape public debate, and must not engage in political debate in a derogatory, dehumanising, or abusive way.

In particular, they must seek to stop intimidation based on prejudice or hate, which has a disproportionately negative impact on women, BAME, LGBT and other candidates from minority groups. It is essential that those in positions of leadership take steps to stop hatred and intimidation based on personal characteristics.



Those in public life must set and protect a tone in public discourse which is not dehumanising or derogatory, and which recognises the rights of others to participate in public life.

Those in public life have a responsibility not to use language which engenders hatred or hostility towards individuals because of their personal characteristics.

The broadcast and print media also have a responsibility to help tackle the intimidatory tone of public life. The freedom of the press is essential and must be protected. Nevertheless, journalists, broadcasters and editors should consider how the content they create might incite intimidation through delegitimising someone's engagement in the political process, placing undue influence on their individual characteristics, or using threatening language. While continuing their important scrutiny of those in public office, they must also be careful they are not unduly or unfairly undermining trust in the political system, especially through portraying stories about disagreements as breaches of ethical standards.

The media must also take active steps to prevent intimidation by ensuring that they do not encourage or incentivise obtaining stories through intimidation or harassment.

Press regulation bodies should extend their codes of conduct to prohibit unacceptable language that incites intimidation.

News organisations should only consider stories from freelance journalists that meet the standards of IPSO's Editors Code, or the Editorial Guidelines of Impress, as appropriate, and ensure that freelance journalists are aware of this policy. Election campaigns are competitive and Parliamentary politics is adversarial. Candidates and MPs must be able to have robust political debate within our democracy without opening the door to intimidation. Where candidates engage in highly personalised attacks, or blur the distinctions between policy differences, professional failures and breaches of ethics, they legitimise the behaviour of others who seek to engage in intimidation. They also undermine trust in the political system.

Those in public life should not engage in highly personalised attacks, nor portray policy disagreements or questions of professional competence as breaches of ethical standards.



#### Summary table of recommendations and timeframes

Recommendation	Responsibility	Timeframe
Government should bring forward legislation to shift the liability of illegal content online towards social media companies.	Government	On exiting the EU
Social media companies must develop and implement automated techniques to identify intimidatory content posted on their platforms. They should use this technology to ensure intimidatory content is taken down as soon as possible.	Social media companies	Immediately
Social media companies must do more to prevent users being inundated with hostile messages on their platforms, and to support users who become victims of this behaviour.	Social media companies	Immediately
Social media companies must implement tools to enhance the ability of users to tackle online intimidation through user options.	Social media companies	Immediately
All social media companies must ensure they are able to make decisions quickly and consistently on the takedown of intimidatory content online.	Social media companies	Immediately
Twitter, Facebook and Google must publish UK-level performance data on the number of reports they receive, the percentage of reported content that is taken down, and the time it takes to take down that content, on at least a quarterly basis.	Social media companies	At least every quarter, beginning in the first quarter of 2018
Social media companies must urgently revise their tools for users to escalate any reports of potential illegal online activity to the police.	Social media companies	Immediately
The social media companies should work with the government to establish a 'pop-up' social media reporting team for election campaigns.	Social media companies	Before the next general election
Social media companies should actively provide advice, guidance and support to Parliamentary candidates on steps they can take to remain safe and secure while using their sites.	Social media companies	Before the next general election
Those in positions of leadership within political parties must set an appropriate tone during election campaigns, and make clear that any intimidatory behaviour is unacceptable. They should challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs.	Those in positions of leadership within political parties	Immediately
Political parties must proactively work together to tackle the issue of intimidation in public life.	Political parties	Immediately



Recommendation	Responsibility	Timeframe
Political parties should set clear expectations about the behaviour expected of their members, both offline and online through a code of conduct for members which specifically prohibits any intimidatory behaviour. Parties should ensure that members are familiar with the code. The consequences of any breach of the code should be clear and unambiguous.	Political parties	Within one year
Political parties must ensure that party members who breach the party's code of conduct by engaging intimidation are consistently and appropriately disciplined in a timely manner.	Political parties	Immediately
Political parties must collect data on the number of complaints against members for engaging in intimidatory behaviour, and the outcome of any disciplinary processes which result from these complaints.	Political parties	Within one year
Leaders of political parties should always call out intimidatory behaviour, even when it is perpetrated by those in the party's fringes. Fringe group leaders and spokespeople should immediately denounce any intimidatory behaviour on the part of their members or supporters.	Political parties	Immediately
The political parties must work together to develop a joint code of conduct on intimidatory behaviour during election campaigns by December 2018. The code should be jointly enforced by the political parties.	Political parties	Joint code should be drawn up within one year – it should be enforced beginning at the next general election
Political parties must take steps to provide support for all candidates, including through networks, training, and support and resources. In particular, the parties should develop these support mechanisms for female, BAME, and LGBT candidates who are more likely to be targeted as subjects of intimidation.	Political parties	Before the next general election
Political parties must offer more support and training to candidates on their use of social media. This training should include: managing social media profiles, block and mute features, reporting content, and recognising when behaviour should be reported directly to the police.	Political parties	At the next general election



Recommendation	Responsibility	Timeframe
The government should consult on the introduction of a new offence in electoral law of intimidating Parliamentary candidates and party campaigners.	Government	Within one year
The government should bring forward legislation to remove the requirement for candidates standing as local councillors to have their home addresses published on the ballot paper. Returning Officers should not disclose the home addresses of those attending an election count.	Government	Immediately
Local Authority Monitoring Officers should ensure that members required to declare pecuniary interests are aware of the sensitive interests provisions in the Localism Act 2011.	Local Authority Monitoring Officers	Immediately
MPs should actively co-operate with the police and other security services working to address the security threats facing Parliamentarians and Parliamentary candidates.	MPs	Immediately
The National Police Chiefs Council should ensure that local police forces have sufficient training to enable them to effectively investigate offences committed through social media. Local police forces should be able to access advice and guidance on the context in which MPs and Parliamentary candidates work.	National Police Chiefs Council	Within one year
The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice for elections should be updated to include offences relating to intimidation, including offences committed through social media.	College of Policing	Before the next general election
The Home Office and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport should develop a strategy for engaging with international partners to promote international consensus on what constitutes hate crime and intimidation online.	Home Office and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport	Immediately
The National Police Chiefs Council, working with the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing, should produce accessible guidance for Parliamentary candidates giving clear advice on behaviour they may experience during a campaign which is likely to constitute a criminal offence.	National Police Chiefs Council, working with the Crown Prosecution Service and the College of Policing	Before the next general election
Nobody in public life should engage in intimidatory behaviour, nor condone or tolerate it. All those in public life have a responsibility to challenge and report it wherever it occurs.	All those in public life	Immediately



Introduction

Recommendation	Responsibility	Timeframe
Those in public life should seek to uphold high standards of conduct, adhering to the Seven Principles of Public Life, and help prevent a decline in public trust in political institutions through their own conduct.	All those in public life	Immediately
Those in public life must set and protect a tone in public discourse which is not dehumanising or derogatory, and which recognises the rights of others to participate in public life.	All those in public life	Immediately
Those in public life have a responsibility not to use language which engenders hatred or hostility towards individuals because of their personal characteristics.	All those in public life	Immediately
Press regulation bodies should extend their codes of conduct to prohibit unacceptable language that incites intimidation.	Press regulation bodies (IPSO and Impress)	By December 2018
News organisations should only consider stories from freelance journalists that meet the standards of IPSO's Editors Code, or the Editorial Guidelines of Impress, as appropriate, and ensure that freelance journalists are aware of this policy.	News organisations	Immediately
Those in public life should not engage in highly personalised attacks, nor portray policy disagreements or questions of professional competence as breaches of ethical standards.	All those in public life	Immediately